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Our approach is based on a tri-partite method of integrating psychodynamic hypotheses,
cognitive subliminal processes, and psychophysiological alpha power measures. We
present ten social phobic subjects with three individually selected groups of words
representing unconscious conflict, conscious symptom experience, and Osgood Semantic
negative valence words used as a control word group. The unconscious conflict and
conscious symptom words, presented subliminally and supraliminally, act as primes
preceding the conscious symptom and control words presented as supraliminal targets.
With alpha power as a marker of inhibitory brain activity, we show that unconscious
conflict primes, only when presented subliminally, have a unique inhibitory effect on
conscious symptom targets. This effect is absent when the unconscious conflict primes
are presented supraliminally, or when the target is the control words. Unconscious conflict
prime effects were found to correlate with a measure of repressiveness in a similar
previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). Conscious symptom primes have no inhibitory
effect when presented subliminally. Inhibitory effects with conscious symptom primes
are present, but only when the primes are supraliminal, and they did not correlate with
repressiveness in a previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). We conclude that while
the inhibition following supraliminal conscious symptom primes is due to conscious
threat bias, the inhibition following subliminal unconscious conflict primes provides a
neurological blueprint for dynamic repression: it is only activated subliminally by an
individual’s unconscious conflict and has an inhibitory effect specific only to the conscious
symptom. These novel findings constitute neuroscientific evidence for the psychoanalytic
concepts of unconscious conflict and repression, while extending neuroscience theory
and methods into the realm of personal, psychological meaning.
Keywords: anxiety, defensemechanisms, repression, alpha, EEG/ERP, avoidance, subliminal, neuropsychoanalysis
INTRODUCTION
Oddly as psychoanalysis seems to diminish in the eyes of many,
neuroscience appears to be taking a long second look at psy-
choanalysis. Interest and acceptance of an unconscious has been
growing. Leading theoreticians have begun grappling with Freud’s
theory, even thinking of it as the most comprehensive avail-
able to psychiatry (Kandel, 1998, 1999), and offering the best
account of recent neuroscience findings (Carhart-Harris and
Friston, 2010). A growing number of psychoanalysts are going
back to Freud’s neuroscience roots, finding in his posthumous
Project (1950) insightful anticipation of modern neuroscience
concepts (Pribram and Gill, 1976). Some have suggested that
neuroscience provides the basic science testing ground to avoid
the circularity of many psychoanalytic explanations (Rubinstein,
1977). Yet there remain powerful obstacles on both sides to a
true fruitful scientific exchange. The neuroscience investigation
of the neural correlates of unconscious processes is often lim-
ited to automatic biases, ignoring the importance of unconscious
conflict, the role of personal meaning, and unique unconscious
processes like repression. In contrast, we present the uncon-
scious that is subject to individual meaning (contained in the
unconscious conflict unique to each individual), is comprised of
complex unconscious emotional processing including repression,
and plays a causative role in the manifestation of symptoms as
in social phobias. Moreover, we show that these processes are
instantiated in identifiable brain events.
Perhaps the two most controversial psychoanalytic clinical
concepts are unconscious conflict and repression. On the basis
of these two concepts psychoanalysts seek to explain a variety of
psychiatric symptoms and how they can be successfully treated.
Unconscious conflict is presumed to arise from opposing desires,
working largely unconsciously and subject to unconscious efforts
at inhibiting or repressing the conflict that can create great anxi-
ety, shape how a person responds to the challenges of life, and can
create a variety of psychiatric symptoms such as the social and
specific phobias we have investigated.
Yet unconscious conflict theory is not the only theory of psy-
chopathology psychoanalysts espouse. Psychoanalysts often refer
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to “conflict theory” as “classical” both in complimentary and
pejorative ways. Adherents see it as the original Freudian theory;
critics see it as essentially outmoded and replaceable by newer
conceptualizations. These different theories all suffer from one
fatal flaw-none have achieved the empirical support scientifi-
cally required to pass muster as an established scientific theory.
Whether you select one theory or another is more a matter of
preference than one based on defensible evidence (Rubinstein,
1977). We decided to exercise our preference for conflict theory
mainly because it was historically the first and has lasted a consid-
erable time; it was also the one we were best acquainted with by
training and clinical experience.
Without doubt one of the most trenchant critics of Freud,
Grunbaum (1984) has pointed out that empirical support must
come from methods that can be shown to be independent of the
clinical method, otherwise circularity is the ever present danger.
In response to these challenges, we applied our research method
in order to find independent evidence for the validity of the con-
structs of repression and unconscious conflict. At the same time
we believed our research method is theory neutral and could be
used by other theories to test their basic hypotheses.
Within psychoanalysis sharply critical voices along the same
lines as Dr. Grunbaum have been heard as well. Outstanding the-
oreticians such as Rapaport (1959) have written extensively on
these same issues. It is important to note that Rapaport’s influence
as a thinker and theoretician went beyond psychoanalysis. He was
an early influence on Daniel Kahneman, as Kahneman (2003)
noted in his Autobiography. Kahneman’s monograph “Attention
and Effort” contained a theory of attention as a limited resource to
which Rapaport had originally led him (Kahneman, 1973, 2003).
Kahneman also incorporated the concept of psychic energy,
another important Rapaport theoretical preoccupation and cen-
tral to Freud’s concept of repression that Kahneman found useful
and renamed effort (Kahneman, 1973, 2003). Kahneman was
intending to spend more time studying with Rapaport; unfortu-
nately Rapaport died prematurely at 50 before Kahneman could
pay his return visit. Interactive contacts between psychoana-
lysts and cognitive and neuroscientists, as between Rapaport and
Kahneman, have likely occurred a number of times, but were not
sustained or further exploited.
Our research group set about some years ago to venture onto
this difficult terrain. The tripartite approach was a natural next
step from the senior author’s previous research in which he was
the first to report event related potential markers of subliminal
unconscious processes (Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968), to demon-
strate unconscious inhibition (Snodgrass et al., 1993a,b), and to
devise methods for investigating two different modes of thought
related to Freud’s concepts of primary and secondary process:
[Shevrin and Luborsky (1961), Brakel et al. (2000), see also Brakel
and Shevrin (2003) for a comparison of Freud’s theory of primary
and secondary processes with more recent cognitive dual process
theories].
Our early studies were designed as straightforward cognitive
investigations incorporating subliminal and electrophysiologi-
cal methods. What they all lacked was any clinical data from
which the existence of unconscious processes and repression were
inferred. The newmethod sought to correct this lack by including
in depth interviews of patients who were also the research par-
ticipants on whom the inferences derived from the interviews
were tested. The initial study we conducted utilizing this tripar-
tite method involved social phobic subjects (described in section
The Initial Social Phobia Study: Establishing Clinical and Brain
Evidence for Unconscious Conflict). A detailed account of the
tripartite method and the encouraging findings emerging from
this initial study were published in Consciousness and Cognition
(Shevrin et al., 1992) and subsequently in a book length treat-
ment including additional findings and three detailed case studies
(Shevrin et al., 1996). The main objective of the initial study
was to determine that our method would provide objective evi-
dence for the existence of unconscious conflict; secondarily it
was hoped that the data would also show a repressive cause
and effect relationship between unconscious conflict and con-
scious symptom experience. This first study (summarized below
in section The Initial Social Phobia Study: Establishing Clinical
and Brain Evidence for Unconscious Conflict) succeeded with
its primary objective, but results for the second were ambigu-
ous at best. We realized that we lacked a neural correlate for
the nature of the causal relationship between unconscious con-
flict and conscious symptom experience. A series of subsequent
studies (summarized below Previous Studies With Spider Phobia:
Alpha Power Serves as an Inhibiting Brain Mechanism in Phobic
Experience) were aimed at investigating the role of alpha power
as an inhibitory agent that might provide the neural causal link.
Following the presentation of these two sets of earlier find-
ings, we describe our new previously unpublished study (sec-
tion The New Investigation: Establishing a Repressive Causal
link Between Unconscious Conflict and Conscious Symptom
Experience) replicating and extending these earlier findings, and
we believe identifying the neural correlate we were seeking.
THE INITIAL SOCIAL PHOBIA STUDY: ESTABLISHING
CLINICAL AND BRAIN EVIDENCE FOR UNCONSCIOUS
CONFLICT
The subjects were eleven social phobics who met DSM IV-R
criteria. Four clinician judges selected individual words to be
presented as stimuli for each subject. In a within subject design
three groups of words were selected. The words were chosen indi-
vidually for each subject to represent the unconscious conflict,
conscious symptom experience, and a group of general nega-
tive valence words [see Shevrin et al.(1996, p. 139 Appendix B)
for a detailed description of the word selection procedure]. The
three word groups were equated for frequency, length, and part of
speech (nouns and verbs). All words were presented subliminally
and supraliminally. The brain responses were measured by time-
frequency features derived from event-related potentials (ERPs).
The essential idea behind time-frequency analytic approaches
is simple: While standard ERP methods depict brain responses
in two dimensions (time and amplitude), time-frequency meth-
ods add a third dimension—frequency. Time-frequency methods
thus represent event-related brain responses as the frequency and
amplitude (more accurately, power) present at each time bin on
each trial, rather than only the amplitude at each time bin, as
in usual ERP methods. “Time-frequency features,” then, refer
to points in this three-dimensional space. The application of
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time-frequency features was a relatively new approach to ERPs
at the time pioneered by co-author Williams (Moser and Avnon,
1986; Williams et al., 1987, 1994; Cohen, 1989; Williams and
Jeong, 1989, 1992; Zaveri et al., 1992). See Supplement 1 and
Shevrin et al. (1992) for further description.
In this earlier study, we used discriminant analysis to select
the t-f features which best differentiated the critical unconscious
conflict and conscious symptom word stimulus categories (vs.
general negative words). These disciminant analysis/classification
findings were then internally cross-validated by performing a
standard development vs. test set (i.e., odd vs. even-numbered
trials) analysis. The t-f feature analysis and its use are explained
in the book length presentation (Shevrin et al. 1996, p. 139
Appendix B).
The main finding was a significant two way interaction
between word category (unconscious conflict vs. conscious symp-
tom) and duration (subliminal vs. supraliminal). The brain
responses to the unconscious conflict words were more cor-
rectly classified subliminally as compared to the general negative
valence control; the reverse was found for the brain responses
of the conscious symptom words (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996).
A second finding concerned repressiveness as measured by a
Hysteroid-Obsessoid Questionnaire (HOQ) that the subjects
completed. The HOQ is a self-report personality trait instru-
ment originally developed to measure obsessive vs. hysterical
personality styles (Caine and Hawkins, 1963; Caine and Hope,
1967). Psychoanalytic theory suggests repressive defenses should
be prominent in those with the latter style. Further, earlier work
(Ludolph, 1981; Shevrin et al., 2002a) found significant positive
relationships between hysterical/repressive HOQ scores and var-
ious other indicators of repressive defenses (e.g., related indexes
on the Rorschach). These two tests arrive at measures through
largely different methods. Here, in the initial social phobic study,
the HOQ predicted better classification of UC stimuli sublim-
inally, but poorer classification of UC stimuli supraliminally.
This finding suggested that an inhibitory repressive process was
at work when the unconscious conflict words were presented
supraliminally, inhibiting conscious recognition of their uncon-
scious significance. The comparable correlations for the conscious
symptom words and the control words were both non-significant
(Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). These two findings, inferred from
clinical material by subjective clinical judgments, and hypothe-
sized to be a cause of the symptom, were paralleled by objective
time-frequency measures of unconscious processes.
The conflict stimuli selected were unique for each subject,
a practice rare in cognitive research. Nevertheless, the positive
results demonstrated that these different stimuli across subjects
produced similar results (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). We further
tested whether the unconscious conflict and conscious symp-
tom words formed unique categories by scrambling the words
across categories to form new pseudo-categories. We used an
information flow measure (Kushwaha et al., 1992), an adapta-
tion of Shannon-type information measures, to assess stimulus-
related information flow between pairs of electrodes. Although
this measure cannot tell us what aspects of the ERP response
(e.g., amplitude, frequency, etc.) are carrying this information, it
does—critically—measure specifically stimulus category-related
information (vs., e.g., other information flow analytic techniques
which do not distinguish category-related vs. background activ-
ity). See Supplement 1 of the current manuscript for further
explanation the information flow technique, and Kushwaha et al.
(1992) for full details. Substantively, Kushwaha et al. found that
significantly more stimulus related information flowed between
electrodes for the true categories than for the pseudo-categories,
convergently indicating that the former were indeed true cat-
egories. Additionally, we found greater information flow when
the unconscious conflict words were presented subliminally as
compared to supraliminally (Kushwaha et al., 1992).
The evidence from the first study with social phobics
established the existence of unconscious conflict on the basis of
clinical and independent non-clinical methods. It seemed clear
that the unconscious conflict stimuli formed unique, individually
meaningful categories. However, what was not clear is how these
stimuli acted as causes of conscious symptom experience.
PREVIOUS STUDIES WITH SPIDER PHOBIA: ALPHA POWER
SERVES AS AN INHIBITING BRAIN MECHANISM IN PHOBIC
EXPERIENCE
We then set about to investigate the link between unconscious
conflict and conscious symptom experience. In our subsequent
studies, we shifted our primary measure of physiological brain
activity from time-frequency features to alpha power measures.
We did so because much recent evidence had suggested that alpha
power may be an important brain mechanism for inhibiting task
irrelevant stimuli. For example, if the same frequency light was
presented to each eye and the subject was instructed to pay atten-
tion only to the left eye, alpha power contralateral to the right
eye increased significantly. Alpha power played a role in inhibit-
ing attention to the right eye (Kelly et al., 2006). If this inhibitory
function were generalizable it might provide the inhibitory func-
tion involved in repression. Charles Brenner, a leading psychoan-
alytic theoretician, had earlier hypothesized that psychodynamic
defenses like repression were made up of normal cognitive func-
tions that were put to specific unconscious motivational uses
(Arlow and Brenner, 1964; Brenner, 1976, 1982). It would fol-
low from this hypothesis that alpha power might provide the
inhibitory function needed for repression, while the motivation
for the inhibition would derive from the person’s unconscious
conflict. If so then alpha power might be the means by which to
quantitatively measure the causal inhibitory link between uncon-
scious conflict and conscious symptom experience.
We set about conducting a series of experiments with spider
phobics. We presented phobic spider images and controls, sub-
liminally and supraliminally. An FFT measured alpha power in
the 8–13 frequency range. Subjects also completed a standard
detection procedure with subliminal images, and rated their fear
of spiders before and after the subliminal presentations (Shevrin
et al., 2010; see Supplement 2 for the published poster abstract).
Snake phobics served as a control for phobic state and rectangles
served as a neutral stimulus control. In this study with spider pho-
bics we did not assess unconscious conflict; our limited aim was
to see if for spider phobics alpha power inhibited responses to spi-
der stimuli and other spider related responses. If this turned out
to be the case, then the inhibiting function of alpha power could
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be generalized beyond the purely cognitive inhibition of distract-
ing or irrelevant stimuli to inhibiting relevant but emotionally
disturbing stimuli. It might then approximate, from a psychoana-
lytic standpoint, a defense resembling repression once it could be
linked to a related unconscious conflict.
The results were encouraging. Increased alpha power corre-
lated with: (1) diminished attention to the phobic spider stimulus
as reflected in smaller N100 amplitude and delayed N100 latency,
(2) below chance (inhibited) detection of spider stimuli in a stan-
dard detection procedure, (3) greater self-reported levels of spider
fear, (4) worsening spider fear after repeated subliminal expo-
sure. Control results for snake phobics and rectangles for these
comparisons were all non-significant (Shevrin et al., 2010; see
Supplement 2 for the published poster abstract).
The results from this study with spider phobics demonstrated
that alpha power went far beyond inhibiting attention to purely
cognitively irrelevant stimuli. Rather, alpha power played an
inhibitory role: (1) when the perceptual stimulus was emotion-
ally significant (a feared spider), (2) when the task was to attend to
an emotionally significant stimulus, (3) when the phobic stimulus
elicited greater anxiety and fear, and (4) whenmultiple subliminal
exposures did not decrease phobic spider fear. The finding that
avoidance worked against improvement following multiple sub-
liminal presentations of spiders suggested that the research might
have treatment implications (Shevrin et al., 2010). It was as if the
inhibitory process was flexible and not bound to a particular task.
Rather, it served a specific unconscious motivation that could be
imagined in these words, “I am afraid of spiders and I don’t want
to have anything to do with them. I will inhibit any process that
increases the likelihood of exposure to spiders.”When put in these
terms it begins to sound like repression. Indeed, as cited previ-
ously, Brenner defined defenses from a psychoanalytic standpoint
as a particular cognitive function linked to a particular motive. In
this instance the particular cognitive function was inhibition asso-
ciated with alpha power, and the motive was to avoid or minimize
fear or anxiety with respect to spiders. These strong indications
that alpha power may serve as the inhibitory brain mechanism of
repression lead us to focus on the role of alpha power in the new,
original study to be reported below.
THE NEW INVESTIGATION: ESTABLISHING A REPRESSIVE
CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN UNCONSCIOUS CONFLICT AND
CONSCIOUS SYMPTOM EXPERIENCE
Much cognitive research had long called attention to the cen-
tral role of avoidance in anxiety disorders. In our research we
sought to demonstrate that avoidance was related to unconscious
conflict and repression, and generalizable across many different
tasks. Moreover, these processes could all go on unconsciously.
It is notable that recently, Klimesch et al. (2011) have provided
extensive cognitive neuroscience evidence that alpha power serves
a general inhibitory function not limited, as heretofore believed,
to distracting and irrelevant stimuli. Its inhibitory function can
be applied to different tasks and stimuli determined by a variety
of top down influences such as expectations. These considerations
parallel our own conclusions reported in Shevrin et al. (2010).
In our first social phobia study (section The Initial Social
Phobia Study: Establishing Clinical and Brain Evidence for
Unconscious Conflict) we showed that unconscious conflict based
on in-depth clinical data exists, but we could not claim that
the evidence established a causal link between unconscious con-
flict and conscious symptom experience. In the spider phobia
study (section Previous Studies With Spider Phobia: Alpha Power
Serves as an Inhibiting Brain Mechanism in Phobic Experience;
Shevrin et al., 2010) we showed how alpha power functioned
to inhibit responses to a subliminal phobic stimulus on differ-
ent tasks (e.g., attention, detection, etc.). From a psychoanalytic
standpoint, the important missing piece in the spider phobic
study was the underlying unconscious conflict creating the nec-
essary motivation for inhibition or repression of spider stimuli.
It seemed clear that now we needed to show that alpha power
served as the causal neural link between unconscious conflict and
clinically based conscious symptom experience.
According to psychoanalytic conflict theory (Freud, 1955,
1957, 1959; Brenner, 1982), neurotic disturbances are the conse-
quence of a conflict of motives operating largely unconsciously.
Any effort to investigate this proposition must: (1) infer from
appropriate clinical material that a particular conflict causes a
specific neurotic disturbance, (2) demonstrate that only when
the conflict is activated via subliminal presentation (so that it
is active outside of the person’s awareness) does it produce an
inhibitory response in the conscious neurotic disturbance, (3)
show that when the unconscious conflict stimuli are supralimi-
nal (so that they are processed consciously) they will not produce
these inhibitory effects specific to the conscious neurotic dis-
turbance, (4) ascertain that when control conscious experiences
other than the specific neurotic disturbance are involved there
will be no evidence of an unconscious conflict inhibitory effect
either subliminally or supraliminally. To summarize: The rele-
vant unconscious conflict specific to the neurotic disturbance
has its inhibitory effect on the neurotic disturbance only when
the unconscious conflict is activated subliminally, and only with
respect to that neurotic disturbance (i.e., the conscious symptom
stimuli). In short, the inhibition is unconscious and specific to the
particular neurotic disturbance.
But why should the inhibitory repressive process triggered
by the activation of unconscious conflict also lead to inhibition
related to the conscious symptom experience? In the current
experiment, the critical condition involves initially subliminally
presenting words related to participants’ unconscious conflict,
rapidly followed by words related to their conscious symptom
experience. These conscious symptom words describe the aspects
of the social situation that are most anxiety provoking and fearful
to the participant, as well as the physiological signs of anxiety the
participant experiences in the uncomfortable social situation. In
effect, the presentation of these words places the participant con-
sciously into the dreaded socially feared situation. But—and this
is critical—these social situations are dreaded precisely because
they themselves also resemble the participant’s unconscious con-
flict. If they did not, participants would not exhibit symptoms
in response to such situations. This fact highlights a funda-
mental point—that conscious symptoms (taken together with
the situations that trigger them) are related to and intercon-
nected with the underlying unconscious conflict. The participant
experiences social situations as if they contain an aspect of the
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unconscious conflict, although the participant does not real-
ize that their unconscious conflict is influencing their conscious
experience. For example, if the participant’s unconscious conflict
revolved around his relationship with his father (as suggested by
example in Supplement 3), then the participant will experience
certain social interactions in the same framework as he experi-
enced his conflictual interactions with the father. Consciously,
it becomes a struggle between enjoying the social occasion and
tolerating increasing anxiety generated by its unconscious signifi-
cance. Thus, from a psychodynamic perspective, repression must
be directed from the activated unconscious conflict toward the
social situation, or the most (unconsciously) conflictual aspects
of it. Accordingly, attempts to inhibit and repress activation of
the unconscious conflict should predict attempts to inhibit and
repress responses to the conscious symptom stimuli. Therefore,
we would expect to find a positive correlation between inhi-
bition of unconscious conflict, and inhibition of the following
conscious symptom reminders. By contrast, purely cognitive
accounts, which lack any concept of unconscious conflict, would
predict no relationship at all between the two kinds of stimuli.
The novel methodological innovation in this new study
was to show that inferences drawn from entirely qualitative
psychoanalytic clinical material can be tested by objectively mea-
surable brain processes so that what is ultimately demonstrated is
an underlying commonality of function between psychodynamic
and brain processes.
Themajor change from the original experimental design of the
first social phobia study was to shift to a priming model in which
the unconscious conflict stimuli preceded the conscious symp-
tom stimuli. A priming model allowed us to empirically assess
the effects of the unconscious conflict stimuli on the following
conscious symptom stimuli, and to scrupulously control for any
potential confounding influences. In all other respects the design
of this new study, presented in detail below, was exactly the same
as of our first study, described in Shevrin et al. (1992).
METHODS AND MATERIALS
PARTICIPANTS
Ten subjects (7 women, 3 men) who met DSM IV-R criteria
for social phobia were selected. The subjects provided written
informed consent prior to participation in the study. The study
was approved by the University of Michigan Medical School
Institutional Review Board (IRBMED) Ethics Committee.
PROCEDURE
After the participants had been selected, 3–4 hour taped diag-
nostic interviews were obtained from each participant and tran-
scribed for examination and word selection [see Shevrin et al.
(1996, 59–90) for details; Chapters 9, 10, 11 for detailed case
studies]. This procedure yielded the Unconscious Conflict (UC)
and Conscious Symptom (CS) primes, selected individually for
each participant. Conscious Symptom (CS) word targets were
also drawn from these interviews, and when such words appeared
both as primes and targets they were always non-identical. A set
of Osgood Negative Valence (ON) words, selected uniquely for
each participant, served as the control (Osgood et al., 1975). For
each of the word groups (UC, CS, and ON) judges selected seven
words for each participant. The three word groups were equated
for frequency, length, and part of speech (nouns and verbs). In
Supplement 3, we present a sample set of words for each of the
three categories of stimuli for one subject.
The selected words were presented tachistoscopically to the
participants. The key experimental condition was subliminal
unconscious conflict primes followed by supraliminal conscious
symptom targets. This critical condition was embedded in a
Prime Type (unconscious conflict vs. conscious symptom) ×
Target Type (conscious symptom vs. Osgood negative valence) ×
Prime Duration (subliminal vs. supraliminal) 2 × 2× 2 within-
participants factorial design. Every presentation consisted of two
words, the prime and the target, presented 1000ms apart. All
primes were presented subliminally as well as supraliminally,
whereas the targets were always supraliminal. Each prime word
was paired with every target word for a total of 196 subliminal
and 196 supraliminal trials (e.g., unconscious word prime 1 was
paired with all 14 CS and ON targets). All subliminal prime trials
were presented first, followed by all supraliminal trials. Otherwise,
prime–target pairs were randomized. Participants were simply
instructed that at a prearranged signal they should fixate on a dot
in the center of a blank field and not blink or move their eyes until
signaled that the trial was complete.
The subliminal stimuli were presented for 1ms duration,
10 ft/lamb.; supraliminal duration was set at 30ms, 10 ft/lamb.
These durations are much briefer than in typical subliminal stud-
ies. We used a Gerbrand Model 3-field Dodge-type tachistoscope,
which is capable of much faster durations than a computer that
requires backward masking to achieve subliminal presentations.
Ambient light was set at 10 ft./lamb., matching the luminance of
the stimuli [see Shevrin et al. (1996) for successful application of
these settings].
MEASURES
EEGs were recorded from 10 electrodes (SCR, OB muscle,
Corrugator muscle, F3, F4, CzPz, P3, P4, Oz, EOG) with ref-
erence to linked ears (A1 + A2). A 10–20 electrode placement
system was used for application of electrodes. Silver-silver chlo-
ride electrodes were used with impedance kept below 5KOhms.
Originally data was collected at 500 samples per second and then
down sampled to half at 250 samples per second for 2 s and
400ms. A total of 600 bins or 2400ms of data were collected.
Grass model 8 EEG machine was used to amplify EEGs and a
hardware filter of 0.3–125Hz was used. LabView on a Macintosh
computer was used to digitize EEGs. Digitized data were then
transferred to a LINUX PC for further analysis. MATLAB was
used for doing FFT and Alpha band power calculations. Alpha
power (8–13Hz), calculated via the Fourier transform, was deter-
mined for the subliminal and supraliminal prime (1000ms) and
target (1000ms) epochs post-stimulus for each trial, and then
averaged within-condition (e.g., subliminal UC primes when
followed by CS targets, etc.). For each participant there were
a total of 49 trials averaged for each prime and target cate-
gory. The experimenter visually inspected EEG recordings online
for artifacts resulting from eye movement, muscle movement
and 60Hz. Trials containing such artifacts were rejected online.
The stimuli were then repeated in the next trial and EEG data
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was re-recorded. Because we did not initiate trials until par-
ticipants indicated their readiness and the ongoing EEG was
artifact-free, very few trials (1–3%) needed to be repeated, and
the proportions of such trials did not differ between conditions.
Because the alpha power distribution was notably skewed across
participants, alpha power was log-transformed before further
analysis.
Themeasure of alpha power we used was absolute alpha power.
We did not divide prime or target alpha by a baseline so the
units in the figures simply reflect alpha power for both the x-
and y-axes. While some researchers divide post-stimulus alpha
by a preceding baseline, others often simply analyze unmodified
post-stimulus alpha power. Both methods are equally valid. For
example, Cooper et al. (2003) and Kelly et al. (2006), cited as prior
research for our own, found increases in absolute alpha power to
play inhibitory roles.
DATA ANALYSIS
Our main interest was in examining the influence of prime alpha
power on target alpha power. To this end, we analyzed prime
influences using a regression approach in which alpha power
for the two primes (UC and CS) were predictors, and target
alpha power was the dependent (criterion) variable. The regres-
sion approach allows estimation and comparison of the unique
(i.e., uncorrelated) abilities of the two prime types to predict tar-
get alpha. In contrast, in the more commonly used difference
score approach (e.g., UC—CS primes) to examining prime-target
relationships, it is not possible to examine the contributions of
the UC vs. CS primes independently, thus leaving it ambigu-
ous as to which of the two factors caused a positive result.
Although not presented here, the main difference results from
these data largely converged with the regression results presented
below.
One might also maintain that the main analysis, rather than
regression, should have been a comparison of mean effects in an
ANOVA. In many situations analyzing the means is helpful. Here,
however, such analyses are of secondary interest, because we are
critically interested in the relationship between prime and target
alpha (i.e., the predictive/causal relationships between the two).
Further, correlations as in regressions are independent of means
and mean differences. For example, mean 1 could be larger than
mean 2, but this says nothing about whether scores in condition
1 are correlated with scores in condition 2. We have previously
documented in our review (Snodgrass et al., 2004a), extremely
subliminal conditions (i.e., wherein detection d′ = 0) frequently
yield exclusively bidirectional effects—that is, effects driven by
individual differences but with nomain (i.e., mean) effects. This is
exactly the case with our data: An ANOVA on our data produced
no mean effects, while the regression analysis was strikingly pro-
ductive. For a comprehensive report of the data, we present means
for all prime and target categories, as well as an ANOVA analysis
in Supplement 4.
Because the subliminal vs. supraliminal prime duration
manipulation is of great interest, we wished to analyze these
conditions separately, so that any differences between sublimi-
nal vs. supraliminal effects would emerge. Regarding reporting
R-square, often cited in regression analyses, in our case this would
be uninformative or even confusing, for several reasons. First,
we are only interested in possible differences in effects associated
with UC vs. CS prime types (i.e., in regression language, their
unique contributions to predicting target alpha). Such differences
are captured precisely by the (unique) partial correlations cur-
rently reported in the text. In contrast, overall R-square reflects
not only the predictors’ unique contributions, but also any pre-
dictive contribution made by the predictors’ shared (common)
variance—and this variance is not of interest here. The current
focus on unique prime type contributions to predicting target
alpha removes these uninformative effects.
Our core hypothesis was that the degree of alpha power-related
(i.e., inhibitory/repressive) brain activity in the UC primes should
predict increased alpha power in the CS targets (i.e., signal-
ing increased inhibition/avoidance), but not for unrelated ON
targets. In keeping with our prior results from the first social pho-
bic study (section The Initial Social Phobia Study: Establishing
Clinical and Brain Evidence for Unconscious Conflict; Shevrin
et al., 1992, 1996), this effect should manifest with UC subliminal
but not UC supraliminal primes. In parallel fashion, any CS prime
influences on CS or ON targets should manifest more strongly
supraliminally than subliminally, an expectation based on the first
social phobic study in which CS effects were only supraliminal
(section The Initial Social Phobia Study: Establishing Clinical and
Brain Evidence for Unconscious Conflict; Shevrin et al., 1992,
1996).
RESULTS
Four separate regressions were performed: (1) Subliminal primes
(UC, CS) with CS target; (2) Supraliminal primes (UC, CS) with
CS target; (3) Subliminal primes (UC, CS) with ON target; and
(4) Supraliminal primes (UC, CS) with ON target. We began by
averaging across all six electrodes (F3, F4, CzPz, P3, P4, Oz).
UNCONSCIOUS CONFLICT PRIMES (UC): SUBLIMINAL AND
SUPRALIMINAL RESULTS
Subliminal UC prime alpha as hypothesized positively predicted
CS target alpha, [t(7) = 2.47, p = 0.043, β = 1.08, partial r =
0.68]. (The scatter plot showing this central hypothesized rela-
tionship is presented in Figure 1.) By contrast, subliminal UC
prime alpha had no effect onON control target alpha [t(7) = 0.79,
p = 0.45, β = 0.36, partial r = 0.29]. (The scatter showing an
absence of an effect for this control condition is presented in
Figure 3). When UC primes were supraliminal they no longer
predicted CS target alpha: [t(7) = 0.74, p = 0.49, β = 0.28, par-
tial r = 0.27], and had no effect on control ON targets [t(7) =
−0.81, p = 0.45, β = −0.44, partial r = −0.29]. Thus, only when
the UC primes were subliminal, and only when they preceded the
CS targets did they produce an enhanced alpha effect.
CONSCIOUS SYMPTOM PRIMES (CS): SUBLIMINAL AND
SUPRALIMINAL RESULTS
Subliminal CS primes, unlike subliminal UC primes, did not
predict CS symptom alpha [t(7) = −0.21, p = 0.84, β = −0.09,
partial r = −0.08]. (The lack of a relationship in this control
condition is shown in the scatter plot in Figure 2.) The sub-
liminal CS primes also did not predict control ON target alpha
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FIGURE 1 | This figure shows the key hypothesized relationship
(partial r) between subliminal unconscious conflict prime alpha and
the following conscious symptom target alpha. Alpha power units are in
squared microvolts, log-transformed. This graph includes measures
averaged across all electrodes.
FIGURE 2 | This figure shows a control condition, in which the
relationship present in Figure 1 disappears. In this figure, subliminal
conscious symptom primes were presented (instead of the subliminal
unconscious conflict primes in Figure 1). The graph shows the partial r
between subliminal conscious symptoms prime alpha and conscious
symptoms target alpha. Alpha power units are in squared microvolts,
log-transformed. This graph includes measures averaged across all
electrodes.
[t(7) = 1.38, p = 0.21, β = 0.63, partial r = 0.46]. Supraliminal
CS primes came close to positively predicting CS target alpha:
[t(7) = 1.81, p = 0.11, β = 0.70, partial r = 0.56], and did pos-
itively predict ON target alpha [t(7) = 2.62, p = 0.034, β = 1.42,
partial r = 0.70]. Finally, given the similar results for supralimi-
nal CS primes with both CS and ON targets, we also pooled both
targets, yielding an overall near-significant result; [t(7) = 2.15,
p = 0.069, β = 1.11, partial r = 0.63].
FIGURE 3 | This figure shows that the relationship presented in
Figure 1 is absent in another control condition. Here, the conscious
symptoms targets (as presented in Figure 1) are replaced with the control
Osgood negative valence target. The graph shows the partial r between
subliminal unconscious conflict prime alpha and Osgood negative valence
target alpha. Alpha power units are in squared microvolts, log-transformed.
This graph includes measures averaged across all electrodes.
POST-HOC FINDINGS
Upon examining parallel analyses for individual electrodes, we
noticed an apparent frontal (F3, F4, CzPz) vs. parietal (P3, P4,
Oz) pattern. We then averaged across these electrode subgroups.
For economy of exposition we focus on the main results; other
findings never approached significance and showed no frontal
vs. parietal differences. These analyses suggested that the criti-
cal subliminal UC/CS finding was strongly present parietally: UC
prime alpha [t(7) = 3.95, p = 0.006, β = 1.37, partial r = 0.81],
but non-significant frontally: UC prime alpha [t(7) = 1.16, p =
0.28, β = 0.57, partial r = 0.40]. Conversely, the supraliminal
CS prime findings were stronger frontally [CS target: t(7) = 2.33,
p = 0.05, β = 0.65, partial r = 0.66; ON target: t(7) = 3.67, p =
0.008, β = 1.27, partial r = 0.81], but non-significant parietally
[CS target: t(7) = 1.43, p = 0.20, β = 0.69, partial r = 0.48; ON
target: t(7) = 1.27, p = 0.24, β = 1.01, partial r = 0.43]. Again
we note the inverse reciprocal relationships between unconscious
conflict and conscious symptom results as a function of category
and duration, paralleling findings from the first social phobic
study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996).
BOOTSTRAP APPROACH REGRESSIONS
While the above findings confirmed our key hypotheses, one
might worry that regression methods with small samples such
as ours could yield unreliable results. Bootstrap methods, which
repeatedly reanalyze the sample data using random resamples,
are a useful tool to check this concern because they non-
parametrically estimate the sampling distribution using the actual
sample data rather than relying on standard assumptions (Fox,
2008). Here, we reran our primary regression analyses, now
incorporating related bootstrapping techniques. For all electrodes
combined, the critical subliminal UC prime/CS target effect
actually improved slightly (p = 0.018), while the subliminal CS
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prime/CS target effect remained non-significant (p = 0.79), as
did both UC prime controls (subliminal UC prime/ON tar-
get, supraliminal UC prime/CS target), ps > 0.35. Further, the
relevant univariate distributions and regression diagnostics indi-
cated no outliers with these key effects, suggesting these findings
were not distorted by this potential problem. Finally, the non-
predicted supra CS prime/CS target and supra CS prime/ON
target effects also improved slightly (ps= 0.084 and 0.009, respec-
tively). Overall, then, applying bootstrapping to the critical effects
suggested they were reasonably stable.
DISCUSSION
The pattern of results supported our main hypothesis for uncon-
scious conflict. Only when the unconscious conflict primes were
subliminal did they significantly predict conscious symptom tar-
get alpha power. The alpha effect was not present: (1) when the
unconscious conflict primes were supraliminal, (2) when the con-
scious symptom stimuli were the subliminal primes (3) when
the control Osgood Negative words were the supraliminal tar-
get stimuli. In short, there was only one condition in which the
unconscious conflict primes were associated with enhanced alpha
power: when the subliminal unconscious conflict primes were
followed by supraliminal conscious symptom targets.
These findings strengthen the interpretation of a cause and
effect relationship between unconscious conflict and conscious
symptom experience. Of particular importance to supporting
our hypotheses, we did not simply obtain some single, isolated
finding consistent with this hypothesis. Rather, based on coher-
ent, interrelated psychoanalytic theory relevant to our hypothesis,
we predicted—and obtained—an interrelated pattern of findings,
including not only specifying where we should obtain the pre-
dicted result (i.e., with subliminal UC primes and CS targets),
but also where we should not obtain the result (i.e., with ON
targets or with supraliminal UC primes). Notably, we obtained
this entire pattern, strengthening the likelihood that the key
results are genuine—and meeting specific recommendations by
Grunbaum regarding testing this fundamental psychoanalytic
causal hypothesis.
The one seemingly anomalous finding, not in itself central
to our hypotheses, was the alpha power effect found for the
supraliminal CS primes and the ON target alpha power. Since
these results were not predicted, they may possibly represent a
false positive finding. Nevertheless, one might wonder that if any
inhibitory effects can occur with CS primes whether that chal-
lenges the specificity of the relationship between UC primes and
repression. We deal in some detail with this troublesome issue
below, calling attention in particular to the findings that CS prime
inhibition never occurs subliminally, it is not correlated with
repression in the initial social phobia study, and it does not cleanly
discriminate between conscious symptom experience and the ON
control targets [the near significant conscious symptom result
(p = 0.11)], suggesting that the inhibition is directed at negative
valence words rather than specifically directed at the CS primes.
From this pattern of converging experimental and control
results we are in a position to infer that only the unconscious
conflict stimuli selected a priori by psychoanalysts from clinical
data causally link clinical inferences based on psychological meaning
(unconscious conflict over emotionally incompatible desires) with
brain processes (patterns of electrophysiological inhibition). If so,
then to our knowledge this is the first psychophysiological evi-
dence for Freud’s unconscious conflict theory of psychopathol-
ogy. Repression emerges as a function of these inhibitory patterns,
as it does in the patterns of psychological avoidance and choice.
From this standpoint, repression is not a neural or psychological
“force,” but a series of unconscious decisions creating a pat-
tern of interactions with oneself and the world. That was what
we found with the pattern of interactions for the unconscious
conflict primes in the current study in which inhibition occurs
subliminally, but not supraliminally.
Could alternative cognitive explanations account for some
of the effects described in our results? The simple answer is
that semantic priming would not predict any relationship at
all between the unconscious conflict primes and the conscious
symptom targets because the unconscious conflict primes do
not constitute a semantic category at all, let alone one with any
relation to the conscious symptom category. Indeed, as men-
tioned in the text, the participants in our earlier social phobia
study themselves did not regard the unconscious conflict primes
as a category when asked to consciously categorize the stim-
uli post-experimentally. On the other hand semantic priming
accounts could explain the results involving the conscious symp-
tom primes and conscious symptom targets, as these do constitute
standard “related” categories. This is perfectly fine with us; we
never thought such accounts would not apply to purely conscious
symptom-related effects. Similar reasoning applies to emotion-
attention accounts; like semantic priming, they would predict
no relationship between UC primes and CS targets (because the
UC primes do not comprise a standard emotional category), but
could account for relationships between CS primes and CS targets
(which do). Furthermore, attentional blink phenomena require
much shorter prime-target SOAs (c. 200–300ms) than ours (c.
1000ms), so this mechanism could not account for our results.
What is it that needs to be explained and further understood
about the phobic experience and how would our findings based
on psychoanalytic concepts advance that understanding? It is
clear that the phobic experience is one of fear, anxiety, avoid-
ance, at times revulsion and disgust.Most important is the general
observation that the phobic person is aware that these reactions
are not substantiated by the nature of the actual phobic object
or situation. Moreover, there is no agreed upon explanation on
how a phobia develops or is sustained. For the psychoanalyst there
might be an answer to be found to these questions when the
role of unconscious conflict is taken into account. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, we learn that it is not the phobic object or situation
taken in its literal significance that is the source of the phobic
experience amply reflected in the conscious symptom accounts.
Instead, it is the way these accounts are related in significance to
unconscious conflict, so that the conscious symptom experience
falls prey to the same repressive influences as are present in the
unconscious conflict and are reflected in our key findings. The
conscious phobic experience is transformed into a stage on which
invisible actors reenact the unconscious conflict scenario, out of
keeping with what is happening visibly. Thus, the repression trig-
gered by the activation of the unconscious conflict, should in a
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similar manner be directed toward the conscious symptom expe-
rience. Our results support this understanding with new evidence
drawing on brain based inhibitory processes, as well as clinically
based accounts of unconscious conflict. However, the influence
of unconscious conflict on conscious symptom formation, and
the role of repression and inhibition in this process presents a
complex system which may unfold differently in different situa-
tions, such as different psychopathology or different experimental
measures. The exact mechanism of this complex relationship is
for future research to determine. But our findings tell us that,
beyond the immediate largely conscious avoidant reactions, there
are important new parameters to be take into account, namely
unconscious conflict and repression.
Two findings require further examination: (1) for the uncon-
scious conflict primes to have an alpha power effect on the
conscious symptom experience they must first be subliminal,
(2) whereas the conscious symptom primes exercise alpha power
effects only supraliminally.
THE SUBLIMINAL CONDITION AND ALPHA POWER EFFECTS AT THE
OBJECTIVE DETECTION THRESHOLD (ODT)
At the beginning of the senior author’s program of research
on unconscious processes, he decided to present stimuli at the
fastest duration possible with equipment available at the time.
The tachistoscope was the equipment of choice because it could
deliver reliably (checked by oscilloscope) a 1ms duration at mod-
erate luminance (10 ft/candles). Under these conditions stimulus
detection was at chance (50%). In a series of studies (Shevrin,
1973) replicable subliminal effects were obtained under these
conditions.
Snodgrass in a series of subsequent studies (Snodgrass et al.,
1993a,b, 2004a,b) combined a signal detection theory approach
with Shevrin’s earlier psychophysical method, making it possible
to go beyond the limitations of classical psychophysics and assess
accuracy separately from bias. This made it possible to obtain
an accurate measure of the objective detection threshold (ODT)
free of criterion bias at which detection (d′) was not different
from zero. Subsequent research revealed that at the ODT different
things happen than at the supraliminal threshold. For example, in
a series of replicated studies (Snodgrass et al., 1993a,b, 2004a,b),
Snodgrass discovered inhibitory processes at the ODT that were
a function of individual differences, findings quite germane to
our current study. These effects were based on standard cognitive
tasks (e.g., word choices). At the ODT different kinds of thought
processes might be occurring. This was borne out in another
study on language processing in which palindrome, or reverse
word priming, was found at the ODT, but not in the supraliminal
condition where only standard forward priming occurred (Villa
et al., 2006a,b). The ODTmay not only be the purest unconscious
state our current methods can produce, but may also constitute
a qualitatively different psychophysiological state susceptible to
unconscious conflict activation. (It is also possible that similar
findings might occur at other subliminal thresholds such as the
subjective threshold at which d′ > 0, but participants aver that
they do not see the stimulus, hence subjective (Snodgrass et al.,
2004a,b). This remains for future research to determine). These
ODT findings raise the possibility that when the unconscious
conflict primes are processed at the ODT they become sensitive
to individual differences, among them, the inhibitory and repres-
sive processes we have found that do not happen when the same
words are processed supraliminally.
THE SUPRALIMINAL CONDITION AND THE CONSCIOUS SYMPTOM
EXPERIENCE
If the reasoning offered above for the unconscious conflict primes
at the ODT is correct, why doesn’t it also work for the con-
scious symptom primes when they are subliminal, but appear to
work only when they are supraliminal? Here two findings from
the initial social phobic study (section The Initial Social Phobia
Study: Establishing Clinical and Brain Evidence for Unconscious
Conflict) are pertinent. First, the repressiveness personality mea-
sure predicted t-f subliminal vs. supraliminal classification for
the unconscious conflict primes only. This relationship was not
found for the conscious symptom stimuli. Moreover, supral-
iminally the unconscious conflict primes were not significantly
grouped together either by the t-f feature analysis or by par-
ticipants’ own category groupings. They simply did not form
a category supraliminally (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). This was
further confirmed by Kushwaha et al.’s (1992) information flow
analyses, which showed that the unconscious conflict category
showed more information flow subliminally than supralimi-
nally, and more than control pseudo-category analyses. Thus,
the unconscious conflict primes were a meaningful category only
subliminally in the first study (section The Initial Social Phobia
Study: Establishing Clinical and Brain Evidence for Unconscious
Conflict), and it was only this category that had a significant
subliminal alpha power inhibitory effect on the supraliminal con-
scious symptom targets, in the new, or second social phobic study
(section The New Investigation: Establishing a Repressive Causal
Link Between Unconscious Conflict and Conscious Symptom
Experience). By contrast, participants in the initial study (sec-
tion The Initial Social Phobia Study: Establishing Clinical and
Brain Evidence for Unconscious Conflict) had no difficulty in
treating the supraliminal conscious symptom primes as a cate-
gory expressing what the participant had previously described as
disturbing about the phobic experience. None of this could be
said about the supraliminal unconscious conflict primes (Shevrin
et al., 1992, 1996).
On these grounds it seems reasonable to suppose that the
supraliminal conscious symptom words were overtly disturbing
to the participants because they brought back the conscious social
phobic experience itself. And when at the same time participants
in the second study (section The New Investigation: Establishing
a Repressive Causal Link Between Unconscious Conflict and
Conscious Symptom Experience) were exposed supraliminally to
other quite negative stimuli (other conscious symptom words
or Osgood Negative words), participants would be disposed to
respond with efforts at inhibition or avoidance, now completely
conscious.
When we compare the supraliminal conscious symptom prime
condition with the subliminal unconscious conflict prime condition,
in both of which evidence for inhibition appears, differences are
found that inform us of the difference between conscious and
unconscious inhibition. For example, there is no evidence that the
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inhibition following the supraliminal conscious symptom prime
condition has any of the characteristics of repression. In contrast,
multiple sources of evidence point to an association between the
subliminal unconscious conflict prime condition and repression.
The unconscious conflict prime condition showed a relationship
to the repression personality measure in the first study (section
The Initial Social Phobia Study: Establishing Clinical and Brain
Evidence for Unconscious Conflict; cf. Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996),
as well as to an independent projective behavioral measure of
repression, with both of these indexes of repression being highly
correlated (Caine and Hawkins, 1963; Caine and Hope, 1967;
Ludolph, 1981; Shevrin et al., 2002a,b). But at the heart of the
matter is the second study’s central finding that only the sublimi-
nal unconscious conflict primes activate the unconscious conflict;
while the supraliminal conscious symptom prime condition acti-
vates the conscious phobic experience. This difference between
what the participant is aware of fearing consciously and seeks
to avoid consciously and what constitutes repressed unconscious
knowledge related to these conscious fears lies at the heart of the
psychoanalytic conception of psychopathology.
LIMITATIONS
Although a substantial amount of prior work (cited above) sup-
ports the inhibition interpretation that we provide for alpha
power, some (e.g., Palva and Palva, 2007) have suggested other
functions of alpha. However, we note their position is based
on phase-locked alpha, not non-phase-locked alpha as in our
research and in the alpha/inhibition literature generally (e.g.,
Kelly et al., 2006). Also, Palva and Palva’s alternative interpreta-
tion is specifically linked to supraliminal stimuli (see their p. 157,
box), and is hence likely not applicable here in any case.
It also might have been useful to have here included a behav-
ioral measure as an independent indicator of inhibition. We note,
however, that our previous spider phobia study (Shevrin et al.,
2010) suggested that greater alpha power was indeed associated
with inhibited performance on a behavioral signal detection task.
Nonetheless, our and others’ future work would benefit from rou-
tinely including behavioral measures of inhibition. We also note
that our stimulus materials (especially UC words), while balanced
on many factors (frequency, length etc.), could not be balanced
for all possibly relevant dimensions (e.g., arousal). This is a nec-
essary limitation due to their completely individualized nature,
a unique feature of this study perhaps essential to investigat-
ing the impact of intrinsically idiographic UC (and to a lesser
extent, CS) stimuli—a fundamental goal of the current line of
research.
Finally, our sample size is small, which raises potential sta-
tistical bias/instability issues with regression approaches such
as ours. The bootstrap analyses, however, suggested our regres-
sion results were reasonably stable, and there was no indication
of potentially distorting outliers. Nonetheless, because this is a
small-sample single study, further replication with larger samples
is needed to more firmly establish our conclusions. We plan such
a larger-scale replication, which would additionally include other
valuable data-analytic approaches such as single-trial analyses and
robust regression methods, as well as a behavioral measure of
inhibition.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
One future direction would take us to applied clinical research.
We would expect that following successful psychodynamic, con-
flict oriented treatment, the same unconscious conflict prime
words presented after treatment would no longer have an
enhanced inhibitory effect on conscious symptom targets. It
would no longer be needed. Another direction might take us
into the curious inverse reciprocal relationship between con-
scious and unconscious processing as a function of threshold.
We have suggested that this inverse reciprocal relationship can
be understood as determining what is limited to conscious pro-
cessing as contrasted with unconscious processing. From this
standpoint the Snodgrass discovery of the ODT may open the
door to investigations of the complex relationships between con-
scious and unconscious processing in normal and abnormal
states.
Lastly, our findings may offer an opening for studying the neu-
rophysiology of repression. The ad hoc results of the second study
suggest that the repressive effect of the subliminal unconscious
conflict primes is more closely associated with parietal alpha,
while the alpha power effect of the supraliminal conscious symp-
tom primes is more closely associated with frontal alpha. Also it
seems that repression emerges as the outcome of complex inter-
acting decisions and choices rather than as a punctiform cause
acting at one particular time.
CONCLUSION
We set out to seek evidence for a cause and effect relationship
between unconscious conflict alpha power and conscious symp-
tom experience. Our findings supported our hypothesis. Only
when the unconscious conflict primes were subliminal did they
have an inhibitory effect on the processing of conscious symp-
tom targets, and this relationship was physiologically instantiated
through inhibitory alpha power activity. The study also yielded
unexpected findings concerning the effects of supraliminal con-
scious symptom primes. In both the initial and the new social
phobic studies, the effects of conscious symptom primes and
unconscious conflict primes appeared inversely related to each
other. Specifically, in the new social phobic study, the uncon-
scious conflict primes only produced inhibition when presented
subliminally and only selectively for conscious symptom targets,
while conscious symptom primes only produced inhibition when
presented supraliminally, and did not discriminate between tar-
gets. We concluded that the supraliminal conscious symptom
effects were due to conscious re-experiencing of the phobia with
attendant efforts at conscious inhibition and avoidance, as occur
in many cognitive phobia experiments. Only when subliminal
unconscious conflict primes enter the picture is another level of
meaning involved that engages repression. We can thus distin-
guish between conscious inhibition and unconscious repression,
only the latter involving unconscious conflict.
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